
Understanding the Google Gemini Calendar Prompt Injection Issue and How to Test for Similar Risks
AI assistants are increasingly integrated into everyday productivity tools such as email, calendars, documents, and collaboration platforms. While this brings clear usability benefits, it also introduces new security risks that do not fit traditional vulnerability categories.
Earlier this year, security researchers demonstrated a vulnerability affecting Google Gemini when integrated with Google Calendar. The issue highlighted a broader class of risks known as prompt injection in tool-connected AI systems.
This post explains what happened, confirms the issue has been mitigated, and provides practical guidance for testers and security teams on how to identify similar issues in other products.
What Happened With Google Gemini and Calendar
Researchers showed that Google Gemini could be influenced by text embedded inside a Google Calendar event description.
In the demonstrated scenario:
- An attacker created a calendar event and shared it with a victim.
- The event description contained normal-looking text along with instruction-like language.
- When the victim later asked Gemini a question such as “What’s on my calendar this week?”, Gemini read the event description.
- Instead of treating the content as passive data, Gemini interpreted parts of it as instructions.
- This caused Gemini to take unintended actions, such as writing sensitive calendar information into a new event.
No malware was involved. No software exploit was used. The issue arose from how the AI interpreted untrusted data.
Has This Been Fixed?
Yes. Google was responsibly notified of the issue and has deployed mitigations.
While Google did not publish full technical details, the company confirmed that changes were made to reduce the risk of calendar-based prompt injection. These mitigations likely include stricter separation between instructions and data, additional filtering of calendar content, and tighter controls on when Gemini can perform write actions.
It is important to note that this was not a traditional software vulnerability with a patch or CVE. It was an AI behavior and trust-boundary issue, and the fix was implemented server-side.
Why This Issue Still Matters
Even though this specific case has been mitigated, the underlying risk remains relevant across the industry.
Any system that:
- Uses an LLM
- Allows the model to read user-controlled content
- Allows the model to take actions based on that content
may be exposed to similar issues if trust boundaries are not carefully enforced.
This is not unique to Google. The same class of risk has been observed in AI integrations with email, documents, ticketing systems, and internal knowledge bases.
Vulnerability Class
This issue falls under several overlapping categories:
- Indirect prompt injection
- Cross-context prompt injection
- AI-mediated data exfiltration
- Trust-boundary violation in AI systems
These issues are usually tracked as research findings rather than CVEs, unless they expose a clear underlying software flaw.
Pentesting Checklist for AI Prompt Injection Risks
The checklist below is intended for security testers, red teams, and product security teams.
1. Capability Mapping
- Does the AI read user-generated or external content?
- Does it have access to sensitive data?
- Can it perform write actions such as creating events, sending messages, or modifying records?
If the answer to all three is yes, the risk is high.
2. Trust Boundary Identification
- Which data sources are treated as trusted?
- Can external users influence those sources?
- Is internal data assumed to be safe by default?
Red flag: User-controlled content treated as trusted input.
3. Instruction Confusion Testing
Insert instruction-like language into data sources such as:
- Calendar events
- Documents
- Emails
- Tickets
Trigger AI interactions that read this data.
Observe whether AI behavior changes.
Expected safe behavior: The AI treats the content strictly as data.
4. Cross-Context Data Leakage
Store sensitive data in one context.
Ask the AI a question related to another context.
Verify that unrelated sensitive data is not exposed, summarized, or moved.
Red flag: AI leaks or relocates data across tools.
5. Read vs Write Boundary Enforcement
Confirm that reading data does not automatically allow writing or exporting it.
Check whether user confirmation is required before any write action.
Red flag: Silent or automatic AI-driven modifications.
6. Action Visibility and Logging
- Are AI actions visible to the user?
- Are reads and writes logged?
- Can actions be audited?
Red flag: AI performs actions without transparency.
7. Defensive Control Validation
- Test filtering and sanitization mechanisms.
- Test user confirmation prompts.
- Verify consistent behavior across all tools and data sources.
Practical Testing Tutorial (High Level)
This is a conceptual testing workflow suitable for responsible testing.
- Identify an AI feature that reads from a data source such as a calendar or document.
- Create a benign data object that includes structured, instruction-like language.
- Trigger the AI using a normal user query that causes it to read that data.
- Observe whether the AI:
- Changes intent
- Exceeds the requested scope
- Performs write actions
- Document the behavior with clear reproduction steps and expected vs actual outcomes.
At no point should testing involve real sensitive data or production users.
How to Report These Issues
When reporting, avoid framing the issue as “AI hallucination”.
Use clear security language such as:
- Indirect prompt injection via untrusted data
- AI trust-boundary violation
- Cross-context data exposure through AI tool access
Clear terminology helps product teams prioritize fixes.
Key Takeaway
The Google Gemini calendar issue was not a traditional hack. It was a design-level trust issue where untrusted data influenced AI behavior.
While the specific issue has been mitigated, similar risks exist wherever AI systems are deeply integrated with real user data and actions.
Testing for these issues should now be considered a standard part of modern application security.
